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Literature Cited  23 based on race and gender as well as poverty eradication as major guiding principles of the new 
nation. The application of these principles to the management of one of  its scarcc resources, viz., 
water, makes South Africa one of the few countries in which water is seen as a fundamental tool 
for achieving social justice and pro-poor economic growth. This is especially significant because, 
worldwide, profcssionals in the water sector tend to confine their concerns for poverty alleviation 
in water management to water supply for domestic purposes. It is true that the lack of access to 
clean. near, and affordable water for domestic purposes is a critical dimension of poverty. However, 
poverty is a much broader phenomenon and encompasses a range of  interrelated dimensions of 
deprivation. Income poverty and socio-political exclusion are other dimensions of ill being, which 
are directly  related to water. The water law in South Africa  seeks to redress inequities and to 
contribute to poverty eradication in productive uses of water as well (Kasrils 2002). 
The early years of  implementation of  the National Water Act (NWA) highlight  how formal 
law can be made to either serve or subvert these ends. The process of implementation, therefore, 
has to be  understood  in light of the socio-political and economic context of  the past (section 2) 
and its links with the present, including the new governance stmctures in which water management 
in South Africa is embedded (section 3). The three actors in the contemporary scenario are the 
new Department of  Water Afpairs and Forestry  (or DWAF), the former vested interests (whites 
and their institutions), and the group that was historically  disadvantaged (black individuals and 
communities). Both whites and blacks respond very differently to DWAFs actions in its role as 
the initiator of  the  implementation  process. The former vested interests seek to maintain the 
inequities of  the past  by  trying to restrict any changes to cosmetic ones and  also by  actively 
scanning the new law for opportunities they can exploit, for instance, the space it provides for 
public participation. In contrast, black individuals and communities-including the newly elected 
local government, which is predominantly black-challenge such attempts made by these vested 
interests while articulating their own needs and aspirations. In this contest about the intentions 
and aims of  the nation’s new  legislation  for people’s  lives, DWAF acts as an  arbiter that 
continuously interprets the law and as an implementer of programs meant to empower the poor, 
once and for all, in the arena of water management. 
The establishment of the Catchment Management Agency (CMA) in the Olifants River Basin 
provides a good illustration of the outcomes at stake in this struggle (section 4). Decentraliaation 
of  water management and the gradual devolution of power to water users organized in new 
Catchment Management Agencies are central to the new water law. The Olifants River Basin is 
the country’s second pilot project. Hence, the lessons that can be learnt from  it (section 5) are 
important for future CMAs in South Africa. These experiences are also relevant for many other 
governments in the developing world today, which are engaged in water reform and which attempt 
to combat poverty by devolving water management authority to the public through new river basin 
organizations (Wester, Merrey and de Langc, forthcoming). 
2. History of  Water Law in South Africa 
South Africa, in the apartheid era prior to 1991, was a country riven by formal racial divisions. 
Under a comprehensive policy  of racial segregation, implemented in an attempt to isolate and 
subjugate the black majority, the government of  the white republic of  South Africa instituted a program of  “Separate Development.” One of  its actions therein  was to carve out a number of 
black “states” within the country’s boundaries.’ 
Comprising no more than  13.5 percent of the country’s area, these ten arbitrarily created 
administrative territories--called  Bantustans or Homelands (figure 1)-were allegedly the original 
areas of settlement of what the state had identified as the country’s nine main African ethnic groups, 
which accounted for more than 75 percent of  the population. Within these territories, several of 
which were highly fragmented, black  South Africans could ostensibly aspire to self-rule (Ross 
1999:  135).2  In reality, these areas-whose nominal autonomy went unrecognized intemationally- 
served merely as dumping grounds for blacks who were deemed in excess of numbers acceptable 
within the white republic. They acted as pooled reserves of labor from where black men-and 
women, to a lesser degree-went to work for long periods in white South Africa. Those who were 
left behind, women for the most part, were relegated to the roles of  sustainers of households and 
caregivers for children, the sick and the elderly (Omer-Cooper  1994:  193-221). Moreover, the 
Homelands were rendered economically unviable given that forced removals led to huge population 
densities that often far exceeded the land’s carrying capacity (Ross 1999: 126, 145-148). Thus, 
the black population was strictly controlled and its members made to assume the role of laborers 
in the white economy while their own agriculture in the former Homelands was systematically 
underdeveloped (Yawitch  198  I ; Unterhalter  1987). The new  multiracial government of South 
Africa, which was elected to power through universal franchise in 1994, continues to be bedeviled 
by  the institutions put in place by its predecessor. 
One of the most noticeable legacies of apartheid in South Africa is the huge extent of poverty 
and the prevalence of  stark inequities in access to all manner of resources. In  1994, 12 million 
South Africans had  no access to basic water supplies and  18 million were without sanitation 
(Kasrils 2002). Unemployment rates in 1999 were 52 percent for African women between 15 and 
65 years, and 37 percent for men in the same age group (Statistics South Africa 1999).  Almost 50 
percent of the country’s population is income poor, spending less than Rand 353 (or US$ 30) per 
adult equivalent per month. 
Furthermore, 70 percent of the country’s poor live in rural areas. In  few other countries is 
income distribution as unequal as it is in South Africa (UNDP 2002: 194- 197). In South Africa’s 
water sector, as elsewhere in its economy, the fault line between rich and poor closely mirrors 
that between white and black users, respectively. 
The distribution of land resources is highly skewed with 13 percent of the population-who 
are white-wning 87 percent of available land (Lahiff 1999; Cousins 2000). Available evidence 
shows that inequities in access to water may even be wider. As much as 95 percent of water for 
irrigation  is used by  large-scale fanners, while smallholders only have access to the remaining 
5 percent (de Lange 1998). In the Mhlatuze Basin in KwaZulu-Natal Province, a mere 10 percent 
of  the population  has access to more than 97 percent of  available water resources,  and only a 
very small part of the benefits from the bulk of the water that this minority uses trickles down to 
the remaining 90 percent of the basin’s population (Steyl, Versfeld and Nelson 2000). 
‘As far back as 1913, it had created “African Reserves” under the Native (now “Black) Land Act, which not only 
stipulated that blacks could only own land within specifically demarcated territories hut also denied them access to 
sharecropping arrangements in areas outside these reserves.  In 1948, racist policies got a boost with the election of 
the National  Party, which was exclusively Afrikaner. Forced removals of  blacks from so-called white areas to the 
reserves, later termed Homelands, officially began only after 1961 (Ross 1999). 
>In  fact, four nf the ten Homelands achieved “independence” from the Republic of South Africa, while the others were 
considered as heing on the path to such self-determination when liberation from white rule was achieved. 91  s Apartheid Government Law 
Under apartheid, the open embodiment of racism in law carried over into the water sector as well. 
As a result, control over water in South Africa prior to 1994 is best understood in terms of the 
co-existence of  two formal but separate legal systems. These are:  1) the apartheid-era laws, 
enforced within the white republic; and 2)  the former Homeland laws. Although superseded by 
the laws of the democratic South Africa, the two legal systems of  the apartheid era continue to 
profoundly influence the implementation of the post-apartheid water law because of the strengths, 
in the case of  the white republic, or the inherent weaknesses, in the case of  the Homelands, of 
the institutions they put in place. 
Jurisdiction over water followed the geographical segregation of the apartheid regime. The 
Department of  Water Affairs (DWA) served the former white Republic of  South Africa (RSA). 
Here, water rights were primarily vested in riparian  rights holders. Commercial farmers, an 
important constituency of the apartheid government, greatly benefited from the services of  the 
DWA  (later renamed the Department of  Water Affairs  and Forestry or DWAF) through  highly 
subsidized scheme and dam development. Gradually, however, the DWA started shifting its focus 
to other important water users, such as power generation and industries, and also intensified water 
quality management. By the mid-l980s, the first basin studies were undertaken in collaboration 
with consulting firms that accumulated expertise for the area in which they were active. The first 
ideas for Catchment Management Agencies also date back to this period (DWA 1986). 
A considerable degree of self-management crystallized among the water users in the white 
RSA. Democratically elected Irrigation Boards managed large-scale irrigation schemes and their 
representatives participated effectively in national farmer organizations. Portions of rivers, in which 
farmers had built weirs, were governed collectively. Large-scale water users also started to organize 
at basin level. For example, in 1992, the Olifants River Forum was initiated  to promote better 
coordination between mines and a national park downstream of  the Olifants River, on the one 
hand, and the upstream mines, industries and the country’s largest electricity generation company, 
on the other-all in common pursuit of a “healthy river.” 
Thus, during the apartheid  era, the white government, large-scale farmers, mining firms, 
forestry enterprises and tourist companies established well-defined, formalized laws and well- 
organized  institutions,  based on  riparian  rights, which  ensured their permanent access to the 
country’s scarce water resources. 
Homeland Law 
In contrast, in  the former Homelands, formal authority over water was vested in the Homeland 
governments, which were represented at the community level by tribal chiefs and councils (hut 
cf. Thompson et al. 2001:  16).3  Each Homeland government implemented its control over water 
’These repressive governments were, for the most p“lt, vassal states of the white RSA.  With its backing, they dismantled 
the  structures of  traditional chiefdoms as they had existed for centuries and replaced them with their minions who were 
hardly accountable to the  local communities they were in charge of  administering (Ross 1999: 127, 135.136,  177). 
Therefore, as chiefs became salaried government officials, staying in office at the whim of a government that was beholden 
to the while South African state, they also risked losing their legitimacy to rule in the eyes of their followers  This nexus 
between Homeland governments and the apartheid state explains some of the animosity people feel towards chiefs even 
today and may also explain the attempts made by the post-I994 governments to replace the authority of the chiefs with 
&L^.^r  ,..:--.:  ....-  A,..-?  :,.  ... L.L  .  I  I .  . and delegated managerial responsibilities in its own way. As documentation and analysis of these 
various formal legal systems have been extremely limited, only broad and impressionistic remarks 
can be made here. Generally, these governments  undertook  some rural drinking water supply 
schemes. Within rural communities, chiefs and their headmen were the main contact persons for 
the Homeland government and any other outsiders intervening in issues concerning water supply 
facilities.  Specific tasks, such as the operation and maintenance of  water supply systems, were 
usually delegated to members of the tribal council, who then formed the relevant committees. 
Most Homeland governments also initiated state-subsidized irrigation schemes in collaboration 
with Development Corporations, which  were parastatal organizations investing in rural 
development. These schemes were usually the only effort to improve agricultural development 
and, for that matter, access to irrigation water in the Homelands. These endeavors were dominated 
entirely by outside agencies, with neither any formal power for the local chiefs and councils nor 
any empowerment of  the farmers themselves, the majority  of  whom were women. Formal 
ownership and management of  land and water in these irrigation schemes and, sometimes, the 
management of  farming and water management operations, credit provision, and marketing 
remained with these parastatals. Formal water rights for irrigation schemes were also in the names 
of governments or agencies. However, chiefs played important de facto roles in land reallocation. 
The domination of  the state and of parastatals  in these irrigation schemes became particularly 
evident when the new government suddenly withdrew support in the late  1990s, as a result of 
which most of these irrigation schemes collapsed in whole or in part! 
Mines intending to operate in temtoria of specific chiefs also approached them for permission. 
Even where Homeland governments gave them formal permission, none of  the concomitant 
responsibilities were adhered to. The mines, which considered both laud and water resources in 
the Homelands as open access resources (i.e.,  resources that were not owned), used this 
unwarranted assumption  as a carte blanche to pollute  such resources  without taking  on the 
commitment to clean up. 
While most questions about the interface between government officials and chiefs in formal 
water law in  the former Homelands are yet to be answered, even more study is required  to 
understand the arrangements within black rural communities that governed water development 
and management in the Homeland areas. As the authority of  chiefs typically concerned all resources 
of the community, the ultimate say over water infrastructure development-such as small reservoirs 
for use by  humans and livestock, water allocation, and water pollution issues-also fell to the 
chief and the tribal council. Anecdotal evidence describes how chiefs set and enforced rules to 
solve problems of  water pollution, or convened meetings to resolve conflicts between users of 
water for domestic purposes and irrigators. These practices and norms were embedded in a 
'Until  now, the government has done little lo reinstall farm supporl systems and to accord farmers formal title to water 
and land rights.  In some cases, large-scale farmers, white or sometimes hlack, have used this legal impasse to occupy 
the collapsed schemes and start cultivating, using lhe idle irrigation infrastructure and extracting water without any 
payment. In one such case, a while farmer took over a large tract of land in the Flag Boshielo (former Arabie) scheme 
in the Olifants Basin by paying a substantial hrihe to the local chief and petty amounts as "land rent"-hut only for 
the first year-to the farmers that occupied the land previously. In order to cultivate this land, this farmer brings along 
his own laborers but also creates limited unskilled agricultural employment for some laborers from the area itself. 
This minimal "gain" divides the local population and blocks any attempts at effective protest against his modus operandi. 
The provincial government sued lhe farmer in a court case over the land issue. But despite 2 years having passed, the 
case has seen no progress. particular cosmology that regarded water as a powerful resource? This comprehensive set of socio- 
political arrangements of rules, norms as well as practices of water use and control that prevail in 
poor rural communities can be called “communal water tenure,” analogous to the much more 
common concept of communal land tenure, which often derived from the same sources of authority 
(cf. Cousins 2000). 
Communal water tenure is intrinsically integrated. In poor rural communities, the same water 
source is often used simultaneously for (un-piped) drinking water, other domestic uses and a diverse 
range of productive purposes. Sanitation and waste management often directly affect water sources 
as well. For instance, water-focused development, with government aid, for one group of villagers 
can easily detract from the welfare of  other users and may jeopardize the fulfillment of people’s 
basic needs. In  short, water tenure in rural communities forms a seamless whole as different 
members of such communities use the same water source for multiple purposes. It is only in the 
view of  theorists that this phenomenon-when adequately magnified,  say, to basin  level-is 
accorded the term “integrated water resources management.” This contention is not as obvious as 
it may seem. 
At least in the case of South Africa, the realization that one is dealing with two vastly different 
social and economic realities is crucially important. The level of socioeconomic and infrasuuctural 
development  in areas that were  under white control far exceeds even the current state of 
development of  areas that were under the former Homelands. It would he misguided then to apply 
a solution that works or worked  in the former to a problem that confronts one in the latter (cf. 
Shah, Makin and Sakthivadivel 2001). The majority of poor black communities are still resident 
in the ex-Homeland areas. In these places, greater community mobilization is needed to resolve 
problems of  water supply and management. 
Consider figure 2, in which the entire cube represents integrated water resources management 
(IWRM). The x, y and z axes of  the cube represent, respectively, (x)  the multiple uses and users 
of water; (y) the scale of the water resource under consideration, or else the site of its application; 
and (z) the essential task(s) of water management related  to the use in question. This view of 
IWRM does nothing short of redefining all water management, both for domestic and productive 
uses, in terms of multi-tiered basin organizations where the lowest tiers function within a frame 
set by  more aggregate decision-making. Important aggregate tasks concern upstream and 
downstream allocation (or aquifer abstraction), flooding and drainage issues, pollution and soil 
erosion. Localized infrastructure development and operation-nce allocation for water abstraction 
is agreed upon-are  examples of tasks to be dealt with by users in the lowest tier in the way they 
see fit. The subsidiarity principle would call for such optimal autonomy at the lowest levels. This 
means that a frame of operation is set at each level, while all possible decision-making on operation 
below that level is left to the lowest level water users (see figure 2). Also, higher-level tiers would 
’One such belief concerns the Mother River Serpent. She is claimed to own the water and live in water bodies, such 
as dams, streams or groundwater. Above all, the Mother River Serpent needs to be kept content. Polluting water or, 
reportedly, drilling modern boreholes are said to anger her and cause her to move away leaving chaosin  the form of 
tornados 01  heavy tlooding-in her wake, which in turn adversely affects the existing water body or water course. 
Traditional healers and prophets are said to stay for long periods in deep waters to commune with her and acquire 
powerful knowledge. Some of these traditional healers and “rainmakers” were renowned for their knowledge about 
the weathcr and seasons  and were consulted about the  rieht timc to  stml c>iltivstim Fnrfher  vnm~  ~ntinm  1u-7- 3. Water Law in the New Dispensation 
Overall Aims 
The transformation from the aforementioned legal systems to a new legislative framework for 
the country  in general and for water management in particular was a fundamental part of the 
political events resulting from the end to the apartheid era in 1994. First, a new Constitution was 
promulgated with the primary aims of (a) redress of past inequities based on race and gender and 
(b) poverty  eradication. The basic human right that “everyone has the right to have access to 
sufficient food and water” is firmly anchored in Section 27 of the Constitution (RSA 1996). Other 
overarching principles stipulated in the Constitution that are relevant for the new water law include 
(I) horizontal cooperation among and within government departments, and vertical cooperation 
among the national, provincial and local levels of government, and (2)  “Batho Pele,” which means 
high quality service delivery by the government to all citizens. 
With the abolition of the Homelands, the jurisdiction of the Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry (DWAF) became countrywide. It promulgated two laws that enshrined the new political 
directions of  the country in the domain of  water management: the Water Services Act of  1997 
(RSA 1997) and the National Water Act of  1998 (RSA 1998a). In line with the Constitution, water 
management was expected to contribute to the principal  objectives of meeting basic food and 
water rights for all, eradicating poverty and redressing inequities from the past. 
Cooperative governance, as stipulated in the Constitution, also figures prominently in the new 
water law. In fact, it is even more relevant for water management as indicated above. 
Strong cooperative governance entails, first and foremost, cooperative governance within 
DWAF.  In this case, it implies coordination  in implementing the Water Services Act and the 
National Water Act and collaboration among divisions of DWAF that are in charge of water supply, 
water quality, groundwater, catchment management and institutional development, water resource 
planning, information, modeling, and so on. An integrated delivery of water services is especially 
important in rural areas where a single water source may be used for multiple purposes with uses 
by one party often directly affecting uses by others. 
Second, cooperative governance implies collaboration among the various government agencies. 
This is also critical for the poor. In the past, high-volume users obtained access, often with 
considerable state support, to the range of production factors that make a water-related enterprise 
profitable. As a result, they succeeded  in establishing large-scale and lucrative enterprises. In 
contrast, poor people still lack access to the range of inputs, skills, technologies and markets that 
render water-related  enterprises more cost-effective. These arrears are to be overcome through 
DWAF’s collaboration with the government departments of agriculture, land reform, health and 
welfare, etc. Inasmuch as poverty is multi-dimensional, the attack on it warrants precisely  such 
an integrated approach.6 
Another major issue in cooperative governance for pro-poor water management from the local 
to basin level is the role of the local government (see below). 
‘An  example of improved collaboration between DWAF and the National and Provincial Departments of Agriculture 
is the drafting of a new national policy to mainstream the marginalized through an integrated approach to agricultural 
water use that also encompasses access to land, markets, credits, skills development, etc. Links are being created with 
the Integrated Rural Development Program-established by Presidential decree-that is to be implemented through  ..  . The Water Services Act 
The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry promulgated the Water Services Act in 1997, even 
before it drafted and disseminated the National Water Act. Political expediency was the main reason 
for doing so as the backlog in  rural drinking water supply inherited from the apartheid era was 
enormous, especially in the former Homelands. In the new dispensation, DWAF had also become 
responsible for rural water supply, including reticulation. This was a new task for DWAF, because 
until  1994 it had only supplied bulk water to municipal water hoards  in the white areas, which 
then took  care of reticulation. In  1994, this task was taken  up by  DWAF in cooperation with 
democratically elected local government, which was just being  put in place at that time. The 
Department was further supported in this task by  the Mvula Trust, an NGO specializing in 
institutional and technical aspects of community water supply. In the long term, local governments 
all over the country are expected to take over full responsibility for providing water services. 
Right from the start the government took the policy decision to guarantee a domestic water 
supply of 25 liters per person per day and committed itself to the provision of the infrastructure 
required  to deliver this quantity of  water within 200 meters or less of  all homes. In  2000, the 
government further pledged that it would ensure that 6,000 liters of water for domestic purposes 
would he delivered for free to each household, every month. (Larger quantities are to be charged 
according to stepped tariffs.)  In the years since it made these commitments, the government’s 
efforts to achieve a minimum state of welfare-still a distant ideal for millions of poor black South 
Africans-have been considerable, both in terms of infrastructure development and the organization 
of delivery for free basic water.’  The National Water Act refers explicitly to the Water Services 
Act and underlines  the need for coordination in implementing these two complementary pieces 
of legislation. 
The National Water Act 
Under the leadership of  the first Minister of  Water Affairs and Forestry, a nationwide process 
was launched to elicit and incorporate public views and to harness global knowledge for the 
formulation of the National Water Act, which was promulgated in  1998 (de Lange 2001). Thus, 
the National Water Act not only broke radically with previous policy aims but also incorporated 
what by  then were nationally and globally recognized  as “best principles for integrated water 
management.”  Such principles  include the integration  of  surface water and groundwater 
management, the gradual decentralization of water management to the lowest appropriate level, 
self-financing of  water management by user groups, public participation  and community 
involvement in water management, the preservation of water for ecological purposes, demand 
management of water resources and, last but not least, a shift from administrative to hydrological 
basin boundaries for water management, ultimately to be implemented by Catchment Management 
Agencies (CMAs). 
In  the Act of  1998, the government put an end to the former system of permanent riparian 
rights. In the new system of water rights, the government, as the custodian of the nation’s water 
’The many problems of implementation on the ground notwithstanding, DWAF’s efforts to provide a basic quantity of 
domestic water for free and also improve sanitation were the chief reasons why a poll in the weekly Mail & Guardian 
(2001/2002: 12) ranked the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry as one of the best performing ministers in the cabinet. 
in resources, guarantees water provision for uses stipulated in the National Water Reserve as a hasic 
human right and authorizes water use for other ends. International obligations and strategically 
important uses  are prioritized. Authorizations take the form of either licenses,* general 
authorizations or, for minor uses, permissions under the so-called Schedule One. The Act also 
introduces water demand management and efficient water use in order to reduce  water use by 
some people and sectors, thus freeing up water for others. 
The National Water Act emphasizes cooperative governance between DWAF and local 
government, in conjunction with the cooperation stipulated in the Water Services Act. The Local 
Government Act of  1998 also explicitly mentions the constitutional responsibilities of  the local 
government for water supply reticulation, sanitation and storm water management (RSA 199%: 
58). The President’s Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy (RSA ZOOl), which targets 
local governments in the poorest former Homelands, articulates the development of water resources 
for use in  small-scale agriculture. Thus, the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) of  local 
governments encompass, in principle, domestic and productive water uses besides other aspects 
of integrated water management. 
However, the capacities of the nascent local government are still fragile. After two rounds of 
national elections since 1994 and  stabilized administrative  boundaries since 2000, this 
democratically elected layer of government is still “finding its feet,” especially in poor rural areas 
where  no such structure existed previously. Hence the constant capacity building  of  local 
government is already recognized as a major precondition for the successful implementation of 
the Water Services Act. Although the Integrated Development Plans are yet to become effective 
planning tools for productive water use, the role of local government as the lowest-level governance 
body for integrated water management will only gain in importance. 
Thus, the government of South Africa seeks to be reconciled with the previous formal law in 
the former Homelands, which vested local resource management authority in only the traditional 
chiefs. The new Constitution and the National Water Act recognize the primacy  of  the recent, 
democratically elected local governments, which are frequently at loggerheads with the traditional 
chiefs whose de facto influence continues (RSA 199%:  56, 58).y Therefore, depending on the 
area in  question, this equitable governance body-i.e.,  local government-continues to be 
challenged either by the traditional, black authority structures or the former white municipality 
leaders, both of  whom retain some of their erstwhile power. 
The questions of how these new governance layers concur with or contest, first, communal 
water tenure arrangements embedded in the traditional power structures, second, attempts of the 
former vested (white) interests to continue their own de facto control of water and, third, DWAF’s 
own responses to the scenarios that confront it, are probably the most critical to answer whether 
or not the goals of the Act of  1998-to redress inequities from the past-will  be achieved. 
“Licenses  are granted for a maximum limit of  40 years, hut can he revised every 5  years.  Pre-1994 “permits” are 
gradually being changed into licenses, provided water is available or can be exchanged with others who are willing to 
give up a pan or  all of their allotment.  All those who want to engage in new water uses have to apply for licenses, 
which are only issued under similar conditions.  Requests for licenses by historically disadvantaged water users receive 
priority.  “Stream flow reduction activities” by large-scale forestry estates, for instance, are also being licensed. 
9This is over and above the fact that, subject to certain restrictions, traditional leaders may also participate constitutionally 
in local zoveminents (RSA 1998b: 56).  However, the extent of overlap between their mandate in customary matters Relevant Components of the National Water Act 
Besides the overarching aims of the Constitution, the Water Services Act, and the National Water 
Act to redress inequities from the past and contribute to poverty eradication, and to ensure 
cooperative governance, there are other components of  the National Water Act that are extremely 
relevant for understanding not only how the Act can potentially transform  society hut also how 
certain provisions built into the Act may thwart its stated objectives. 
1.  Basic Human  Water Needs: The National Water  Act stipulates that the government 
must, before catering to any other use, allocate a Reserve “to satisfy basic human needs 
by securing a basic water supply as prescribed under the Water Services Act (1997).” As 
indicated above, the government’s policy also entails the commitment to develop the 
infrastructure required to meet these basic human needs and to ensure a minimum quantum 
of water delivery for free. The Ecological Reserve is also a priority allocation under the 
National Water Reserve. 
2.  Demographic Representation: According to the National Water Act, governance bodies 
should he representative in terms of  including sections of  the population  that were 
previously unrepresented in governance forums--especially,  blacks and women. The 
Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry has far-reaching powers to ensure proportional or 
demographic representation in new legal governance structures such as CMAs. 
Compulsory Licensing for Water Reallocation: The legal tool in the National Water Act 
that allows reallocation  of  water from high-volume users to poor water users is termed 
Compulsory Licensing. DWAF can call for “compulsory licensing” where and when 
needed. A project of compulsory licensing concerns all water users in a specific area. It 
cancels all existing licenses and replaces them on the basis of a new allocation schedule. 
Redressing race and gender inequities  from the past is a key  criterion for such a 
reallocation.  This is the case even if  the reductions result “in severe prejudice to the 
economic viability of an undertaking in respect of which the water was beneficially used.” 
Normally, in such a situation, a person may appeal to the Water Tribunal for “compensation 
for any financial loss suffered in consequence” (National Water Act, Sections 22 (6)  and 
43 to 48).”  The inclusion of this clause weakens the possibility  of reallocating water. 
Fortunately,  there is a safeguard built  into the Act that exempts the payment of this 
compensation if  water is reallocated to “(i) provide for the Reserve; (ii) rectify an over- 
allocation of  water use from the resource in question; or (iii) rectifL an unfair or 
disproportionate water use (italics added)” (National Water Act, Section 22 (7)). It is vital, 
therefore, that this safeguard he implemented effectively. 
3. 
The above-mentioned elements of the Act potentially foster the transformation of South African 
society towards greater equity. However, the drawbacks of the Act are that it (1)  retains, unaltered, 
‘‘Mama de Lange (2001) describes the process of  formulation of the Water Act, saying that, “Initially, the Minister 
was opposed to any form of compensation for reduced or lost water allocations.  However, in meetings with the Minister 
and through the press, the agricultural sector pointed  out that this would be  unconstitutional, a position that was 
confirmed by constitutional lawyers advising the Minister.” the status quo of the apartheid era in two fundamental ways, and (2)  introduces legal tools that 
risk marginalizing small-scale water users even further. These drawbacks are as follows. 
1.  Existing Lawful Use: The National Water Act recognizes all existing water use in the two 
years preceding  the promulgation  of  the Act as lawful and, hence, also accepts the 
inequities prevailing at that time. Moreover, the acceptance of  “existing lawful use” as 
the starting point of  institutionalizing formal water rights favors those who had written 
documents, such as permits recognized under apartheid law in the white areas. These 
provide much stronger proof of lawful water use in the past when compared with what 
the inhabitants of the former Homelands can marshal  as evidence of  their prior use of 
water. At hest, the latter can refer to notions of established use embedded in what were 
typically verbal contracts or communal water tenure arrangements. 
Composition of  the Civil Service: Nationwide, there were no forced retrenchments in the 
government administrative  services in the new  dispensation. This resulted in the new 
approach to water resources management being  implemented by many of the officials 
responsible for executing the previous, inequitable legislation. 
Basic Human Income Needs: Water for productive purposes, which help income-poor 
women and men to improve the harvests of their homestead gardens or fields, or use water 
for their poultry and livestock enterprises or cottage industries, is not covered explicitly 
in the National Water Reserve. Even Schedule One, which specifies uses of small quantities 
of  water that are permissible  under any condition-without need  for registration, 
authorization, or payment, also in (sub-) basins that are declared as being “water- 
stressed”-is  not clear on whether the use of  water is permitted for producing goods that 
will be sold for a minimal income is permitted. “Schedule One Water Uses” deal only 
with water used  for reasonable domestic use, livestock other than feedlots, and “small 
gardening not for commercial purposes.” However, at least a part of the harvest obtained 
by poor farmers from their farms and gardens is market-oriented, a proportion that is only 
expected to grow in the future. As the numbers of  those who already have or who hope 
to obtain the requisite infrastructure in order to irrigate small portions of their homesteads 
or use water for other productive purposes increase, the competition with the few high- 
volume users present in the same (sub-) basin is likely to intensify. The protection of the 
water rights of  the former group-which  an amended National Water Reserve would 
assure-rather than merely the grant of permission to use small amounts of water without 
any guarantee, which  an  amended Schedule One would  give, will probably make a 
difference to the security of  rural livelihoods. 
2. 
3. 
However, the practical  implementation of  any protection  or authorization  of low-volume 
productive use requires different tools than those available now. Tracing millions of low-volume 
water users for formal registration and authorization through  licensing would he a logistical 
nightmare. The formal registration of water use, which is currently underway, for example, excludes 
irrigated farms below two hectares. Legal tools, such as (compulsory) licensing are effective and 
indispensable to vest rights in and to regulate a small number of high-volume users. But they are 
inappropriate for even assessing the quantum of  current water use by  a large number of  small- 
scale users let alone for providing (I) any of  the benefits of (tradable) licenses to them, or (2) 
”-..  Inrnl ..--+a,+:nm  +-  thnrn ..CP-.L.  ..ro;nnt  tho offr.rtr  r.f +ha hinh.Tmlnmp  tn  .,,reat  rnntrnl over scarce water resources. Similarly, disempowerment also occurs when formal entitlements to 
water are a precondition for membership of, for example, former Irrigation Boards and current 
Water Users Associations. Other forms of entitlement should ensure that the formal rights of poor, 
small-volume water users-versus high-volume users-become stronger than what they were under 
apartheid. In any case, whenever decisions about the interpretation of the text of the National 
Water Act are made, the communication of  this decision to the rural poor is essential. Currently, 
few, if  any, of them are even aware of the possible implications of  the National Water Act for 
strengthening their rights to water for productive uses. 
To conclude, the compromises struck between changing and maintaining inequities in  South 
African society undoubtedly contributed to what is probably the most remarkable achievement of 
the formulation of the National Water Act, which is that most of  the highly diverse stakeholders in 
this "Rainbow Nation" not only endorsed the law but also take pride in this unique piece of legislation. 
4. Establishment of Catchment Management Agencies 
CMAs in the National Water Act 
The interactions between the old and new formal legal systems in South Africa are apparent in 
the establishment of Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs). In compliance with the National 
Water Act, the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry has started the process of establishing CMAs 
in the nineteen Water Management Areas (or WMAs) of South Africa (figure 3). Gradually, he 
will assign considerable water resource management powers that are currently held by DWAF to 
these new governance structures. Each CMA is supposed to compile a Catchment Management 
Figure 3.  The nineteen  Wafer Management Areas (WMAs) in South Africa. 
-~ Strategy (CMS) relevant for the WMA under its jurisdiction and, ultimately, to cmy  out functions 
such as water resources planning in the catchment, registration, water charge collection, water 
authorization, and licensing (including compulsory licensing). CMAs are to become self-financing. 
Public participation in the process of establishing CMAs and fair representation of all stakeholders 
in the future Governing Board and activities of the CMAs are legally required. In the Governing 
Board, the interests of  local and provincial government, current and potential water users, and 
environmental interest groups are to be represented. One of the five initial tasks of a CMA is "to 
promote the co-ordination of  its implementation with  the implementation of  any applicable 
development plan established in terms of the Water Services Act (1997)"  (RSA 1998a). 
This change from a centralized management approach based on command and control from 
the nation's capital to a decentralized participatory model based on cooperative governance and 
coordination through  CMAs is extremely  significant (Muller 2001). Parallel to the process of 
establishing  CMAs in the Water  Management Areas, DWAF itself  is being  restructured.  The 
remaining national functions of DWAF are being defined, and preparations for reorganizing DWAF 
regional offices into technical support structures of the CMA in the new Water Management Areas 
have begun. As long as CMAs are still being established and are maturing, DWAF will continue 
to carry out all functions not yet taken up by the CMAs themselves. 
The focus of the rest of this paper is on the formal establishment process of the CMA in the 
highly water-stressed Olifants Basin, the nation's second pilot basin for this process." The Olifants 
River has its source in Gauteng province and passes through Mpumalanga and Limpopo provinces 
into the Kmger National Park, before entering Mozambique where it joins the Limpopo River 
(figures 4 and 5). More than three million people, the majority of  whom are poor, live in this 
water-stressed basin. Further, many of these poor live in the congested former Homelands of 
Lebowa, KwaNdebele and Gazankulu 
Figure 4. The nine Pmvinces of  South Africa 
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The DWAF Regional Office in Mpumalanga drives the process of  CMA establishment in the 
Olifants Basin (Ligthelm 2001). This process is especially informative because, in the course of 
it, two highly contrasting approaches were devised and implemented. These approaches illustrate 
how various actors seek to use the design stage of  this new institution as an arena in which to 
either change or further entrench the inequitable conditions of the past. 
Formulation of  a Technical Proposal for CMA Establishment 
The leading approach in establishing the CMA in the Olifants Basin highlights how those who 
dominated water control during the apartheid era continued to exercise power afterwards. Although 
historically disadvantaged individuals were included in the decision-making process during the 
establishment of the CMA, theirs was merely a token presence. Furthermore, the participation of 
blacks in the functioning of the future CMA was envisaged as being even more limited than in 
the run-up to the CMA's establishment, notwithstanding the fact that the inclusion of historically 
disadvantaged water users in the process was emphasized by DWAF from the very beginning. 
For this reason, DWAF rebuffed a proposal by large-scale users to reinforce the control they had 
enjoyed during apartheid.This happened when the Olifants River Forum-comprising the white- 
dominated mines, industry, the public sector electricity  supply company, and eco-tourism 
throughout the Olifants River Basin-proposed that they themselves would constitute the CMA 
and then take the process ahead. This suggestion was made as soon as the new  governance 
structures of  CMAs were  adopted in the deliberations over the National Water Act. However, 
DWAF, rejected this suggestion. 
DWAF launched  the process of establishing a CMA in the Olifants Basin in mid-1999 by 
appointing technical consultants who had accumulated technical knowledge about this basin during the previous decade. These consultants had  also begun quantifying the Ecological Reserve for 
this basin. As stipulated in their terms of reference, the main purpose is to submit a formal proposal 
for a CMA to the Minister  and  to assist DWAF in establishing  representative catchment 
management  structures. Two rounds of public meetings were held  in five places  in the basin, in 
order to inform and consult people who would be affected. Approximately 700 people participated 
in each round. Invitations for these public meetings were sent not only to all contacts of DWAF 
and the consultants in question, but also to local governments, tribal authorities, traditional healers, 
etc. Although new contacts between DWAF and rural communities were established in this way, 
the procedure adopted was unsystematic. Local governments, which were still in their infancy at 
the start of  the process, had  no  specific role.  Furthermore, this oversight of  local  government 
officials was to continue in later phases even though they had become much better consolidated 
by  then. 
The first round of  public meetings consisted primarily of  information provision  about the 
concepts of basin-level management through CMAs and public participation. After the first round 
of  open consultations, DWAF and the consultants decided  to add a second round in order to 
publicize  the ideas that they had developed for the future structures of  the CMA. In  all public 
meetings, the miii  language was English with translators only providing summarized translations 
in  local  languages on request. By  mid-2000, an incomplete draft proposal  was finalized. The 
consultants were the main  authors of  this proposal, which  was made up largely of  technical 
information and water use projections that were essentially available even before the process of 
establishing CMAs had begun. 
The black participants were certainly interested  in establishing contacts with DWAF, often 
for the first time in history. However, they were also quite critical of the consultants and DWAF, 
especially with regard to the agenda of the meetings and the way  in which their representation 
was treated. With regard to the agenda, they were particularly dissatisfied about the way in which 
the issue of drinking water supply was handled.  Invariably, participants  raised their pressing 
problems about the lack of adequate and/or clean drinking water during the meetings. However, 
DWAF officials  as well as the consultants referred  people  to other divisions within  DWAF, 
explaining that the CMA was one of the many parallel processes in which DWAF interacts with 
the public and, therefore, tries to avoid an inter-departmental  duplication of  tasks. Other problems 
included: frustration regarding English being the main language used  in all meetings; suspicion 
about the dominance, once again, of  white consultants as perceived process drivers and as the 
ones earning high salaries from a process that was seen as being very expensive; negative feelings 
after the consultants’ explanation of the Ecological Reserve (“as if they find fish more important 
than our lives”); and complaints about a lack of  time for proper preparation  and discussion  and 
inadequate explanations of  what the issues really  are. These were all drawbacks of  the process 
according to the black participants. 
The issue of representation also generated strong negative sentiments. A so-called Stakeholder 
Reference Group (SRG) was established to discuss the CMA proposal more in-depth. Originally, 
the SRG consisted of  (white) user groups that were already  in contact with the consultants and 
DWAF. They usually belonged to existing networks and reported hack to those they represented. 
However, black participants for this SRG were invited in an ad hoc manner during the first round 
of public consultations. A restricted number of  volunteers that could participate without being 
required to represent a constituency or report back to  it was invited. Many  black participants 
regretted that there was no opportunity to interact with a constituency and thus ensure that their inputs were mandated. Instead of being able to give authorized views, they could only contribute 
their personal perspectives. 
It was especially regretted that local government officials had not been officially invited to 
the public and Stakeholder Reference Group meetings, even when chiefs and their representatives 
were invited. Statements were made to the effect that some uninvited local government officials 
had threatened their traditional counterparts that they would make every attempt to derail any 
process of village-level development that did not have their explicit sanction or had not required 
their active participation  or decision-making input. It is odd that local  government had been 
excluded from the Stakeholder Reference Group when it is the sole representative body  at the 
lowest level of the state’s governance structure and a logical channel for the implementation of 
any development process. 
After a long delay, in February 2002, a final meeting with the Stakeholder Reference Group 
was held hefore formally submitting the CMA proposal, which was not much different than the 
earlier draft. However, even at this meeting, the participation of black stakeholders was little more 
than nominal. Problems from the previous meetings had not been properly  addressed and were 
repeated as a result. And once more, the wishes of many poor stakeholders for a more integrated 
approach to water management  by  the CMA-one  that considered  both  the consumptive and 
productive uses of water in their communities-were peremptorily disregarded. 
Ironically, albeit for different reasons, the process also ended up disappointing the self- 
organized high-volume water users and others who had worked closely with DWAF before 1994. 
Their hope that a reliance on formerly collected technical expertise and the emergence of a new 
public space for catchment management would easily enable them to continue exerting a de facto 
voice in water management is at least partly  vanishing. This trend is true of  both  the Olifants 
Basin and the adjacent Inkomati Basin, which was the first pilot project where a similar approach 
of  formulating a proposal  through technical  consultants had been adopted. In the Inkornati, for 
example, an active proponent of  the National Water Act and strong defender of  the interests of 
large-scale farmers acknowledged that the public (read “white”) participation that was expected 
through CMAs was a major reason to endorse the Act upon its formulation. However, later she 
felt that the expectations raised had been in vain (Pieter Waalewijn, personal communication, 2001). 
Bottom-Up Institution Building for River Basin Management 
Early on in the first approach of CMA establishment discussed above, the DWAF Regional Office 
quite rightly identified the problem that small-scale irrigators risked being overlooked. Whereas 
large-scale farmers were well organized and represented in the CMA process, the many small- 
scale imgators were typically unorganized and had no avenue through which to voice their interests 
and concerns. Therefore, just after the  first round  of public meetings, a parallel process of 
consultations was initiated throughout the Olifants Basin, which aimed at a bottom-up 
reconnaissance of small-scale water users’ needs and their suggestions for ways to ensure their 
effective voice, for example, through Small-Scale Water Users Forums. The lead implementer of 
the process was a (black) community development activist. Her network of contacts throughout 
the hasin  originated from her rural  development activities during and after the anti-apartheid 
struggle. This network included most local governments and also various NGOs, which facilitated 
the logistics of the meetings. 
Nine daylong workshops were held in the local language of  the region with a total of  365 
participants in  attendance. These workshops generated overviews of the problems participants experienced with regard to water, including drinking water-which was often most urgent-but 
also rainfed and irrigated agriculture, and disputes with large-scale users about water allocation. 
The debates also encompassed issues indirectly related to productive water use, such as the lack 
of markets, inputs and training for both irrigated and rainfed  agriculture, and frustrations about 
the slow pace of land reform. The participants made concrete suggestions for the organization of 
multi-tiered  Small-Scale Water  Users  Forums for effective representation  in the  future CMA 
Governing Board and Committees. These new CMA structures were also meant to enable technical 
support and exchanges on water issues and to address development issues that were less directly 
related to water. The report on these workshops (Kliumbane, de Lange and Sibuyi, forthcoming) 
will  be included  as an  appendix in the final technical  proposal  compiled by  the consultants 
mentioned above. Aftcr submitting the report, the community development  activist continued 
working on water-related and other issues in poor communities. 
In  sum, the approach taken  by  the development activist is essentially bottom-up institution 
building for pro-poor river basin  management. Besides continuity, an  intrinsic feature of  this 
approach is collaboration with local government, NGOs, community-based organizations, other 
development initiatives and with traditional chiefs. Poor people, especially women, are mobilized 
to innovate in tapping more water sources and using water more productively, for example, through 
water harvesting for homestead gardening and tree cultivation for food security. Mediation between 
large-scale  water users and poor communities quarrelling over shared water sources is another 
important component. The development activist intercedes in disputes between communities, mines 
and DWAF to solve problems such as excessive groundwater abstraction by mines, which dries 
up boreholcs for domestic water supply in neighboring communities. Wherever high-volume water 
users already recognize the need to improve social justice in their localities, she harnesses their 
willingness into an encompassing process of dialogue between the non-poor and poor for better 
sharing of water, water-related benefits as well as other benefits. Thus, white control over water 
and other resources,  established during the apartheid era, is gradually being transformed into a 
more equitable sharing of benefits and decision-making, which incorporates the views of the black 
rural poor. 
5. Conclusions: Redressing Inequities in the Future 
The early initiatives to establish the CMA of  the Olifants River Basin highlight, in a nutshell, 
very divergent interpretations of the broad legal framework set out by  the National Water Act, in 
general, and this important new water management institution, in particular. Initially, DWAF steered 
the establishment process so as to ensure, that the historically disadvantaged groups would be 
included from the start. In doing so, it countered the ambitions of white self-organized water users 
who wanted  to themselves take the lead in the process.  Even so, in the subsequent process, 
considerable differences emerged in the way DWAF and its appointed consultants formulated the 
proposed CMA, on the one hand, and the manner in which members of rural black communities 
elicited and proposed suggestions to the CMA's  design, on the other. The latter raised the issues 
that need to be part and parcel of the design of CMAs as well as other policies and institutions, if 
the overarching aims of  water management in South Africa are to be achieved. These include the 
following: I.  Domestic Water Use in the Mandate of  CMAs 
The decision to promulgate the Water Services Act before the National Water Act risks leading to 
an exacerbated and artificial separation of  water used for domestic and productive purposes.  In 
this separation, it is presumed that water resources could be managed by ignoring domestic uses 
of the same water source. Poor water users in both rural and urban areas are supposed to conceive 
of  and discuss their genuine needs for water for productive purposes while ignoring  their still 
unmer needs for domestic water. It is also assumed that the local government, supported by specific 
departments in DWAF, is solely responsible for meeting domestic water needs of the poor. CMAs, 
Water User Associations and all other institutions concerned with “Water Resource Management” 
can, therefore, safely ignore these needs. 
This separation may be justified in better-off areas, where domcstic water supply is well catered 
for. However, such a disjunction would risk alienating all those South Africans whose domestic 
water needs are still largely unmet from mainstream water management. Moreover, it would be 
an abrogation of the basic principle of cooperative governance. DWAF’s Regional Office in Kwa- 
Zulu Natal found a way out of this dilemma. There, DWAF staff from various departments took 
the initiative to align their services on  the ground into an  integrated  “one-window” service, in 
which integrated water use and management in the communities themselves was taken as a starting 
point. Incentives were created for staff within departments to cooperate in service delivery. 
At the national  level too possibilities for synergy in meeting both domestic and productive 
water needs-for example, in the design of drinking water facilities infrastructure-are increasingly 
being explored. Such initiatives need constant reinforcement. 
2. Productive  Water Use by the Poor Promoted through CMAs 
CMAs will better convince historically disadvantaged water users that “there is something in it” 
for them if CMAs help them to increase their incomes, besides improving their health and liberating 
them from drudgery of fetching water from distant sources. This implies that CMAs are to stimulate 
access to affordable water infrastructure for productive water use  in cropping, livestock, 
community-based forestry, fisheries, and so on. In the former white Republic of  South Africa 
(RSA), the department-then the DWA-provided huge subsidies for massive dam development 
and large-scale irrigation infrastructure. To  some extent, DWAF continues to do so for mines. 
industries and, to a lesser extent, for large-scale farming. The extension of similar benefits to those 
who failed to benefit in the past seems equally justified and should be a major consideration in 
Catchment Management  Strategies. In new  programs for pro-poor  water development, recent 
insights are to be incorporated, for example, with regard to the importancc of building upon existing 
communal tenure, promoting, where feasible, decentralized infrastructure such as village dams, 
treadle pumps, and other appropriate  technologies; ensuring community  ownership of  new 
infrastructure and providing the required institutional capacity building; and guaranteeing access 
to agricultural inputs, markets, credit and entrepreneurial training. Financial  and other support 
can be channeled via the CMA Governing  Boards and related bodies of  the CMA to local 
government, NGOs, newly established Water Users Associations in poor communities, and other 
grassroots organizations. Mutual learning and exchange among the historically disadvantaged 
communities can be stimulated through the CMA as well. 3. Poor People’s Water Rights Protected 
Poor people tend to lose out if  they have to compete with the privileged  large-scale water users, 
such as mines that over-abstract groundwater used by  poor communities, or large-scale farmers 
who claim their former lawful use vis-i-vis the poor who want to use the same water source for 
cattle, homestead gardening and even for domestic purposes. These conflicts emerged during CMA 
establishment  and will, in all likelihood, influence its future functioning. With  the currently 
envisaged devolution of  powers to the CMA, such issues will fall under the jurisdiction of  the 
CMAs themselves. As unregistered Schedule One users, the poor will have no legal  backing. 
Therefore, effective methods and skill development are needed to resolve conflicts between large- 
scale and small-scale water users. Legal tools to support equitable water allocation will also be 
indispensable.  A better understanding of  local notions of  registration  of  use, legitimacy of  use, 
allocation principles, dispute resolution mechanisms. and communities’ collective rights vis-a-vis 
outsiders according to local law would inform policy makers about how to specify new regulations 
that effectively empower poor people. Moreover, more insights into communal water tenure could 
also help to solve intra-community conflicts over water, a field in which the National Water Act 
is as yet unable to provide any support. 
4. Cooperative Governance with Local Government 
The first CMAs are expected to be established  soon. The National Water Act  requires a 
demographically representative composition of the Governing Board and the Minister has far- 
reaching powers to ensure such a composition. However, even if  the composition of the new CMA 
is equitable, what is less clear and more contentious is the issue of how the CMA will deal with 
the fact that only a limited group of water users in the Water Management Area was reached in 
the process of  actually establishing the CMA itself. This is because the process of  public 
participation  is still largely incomplete. In general, there are two options. 
One option is that the CMA basically continues with the “public” that happens to be on board 
at this stage, especially  in the Stakeholder Reference Group (SRG). Activities such as the 
formulation  of  the  Catchment Management  Strategy that warrant  public participation would 
primarily be discussed with this group. However, the ad hoc nature of  this group, the lack of 
representativeness and, especially, the oversight of  local government render the  SRG hardly 
credible as a representative body for the historically disadvantaged. 
At the same time, the well-organized water users in the SRG have a much stronger mandate 
from their constituencies. Moreover, they enjoy longer-term contacts with  DWAF, are better 
informed, are comfortable speaking English, can read the CMA documents, are mobile, and have 
access to lawyers if  there are conflicts. Therefore, the presence of  blacks in the SRG seriously 
risks remaining nominal, merely providing a rubber stamp to the claim that inequities of the past 
are being  redressed  in the process of CMA establishment. Hence, another option needs to be 
developed. 
The alternative-one that is much more appropriate-is that a new CMA should start a well- 
designed process to institutionalize public participation according to the subsidiarity principle, as 
one of  its major tasks to ensure that those who were marginalized  in the past are now the most 
empowered. Ultimately, the CMA would  coordinate water management planning and 
implementation with the local government at local, district, provincial  and national  levels. The 
Catchment Management Strategy would basically  be  an aggregate of  the integrated  water and priorities should be modified to account for priority areas identified for the recently launched 
lntegrated Rural Development Program in those areas in the former Homelands where it is being 
implemented. Active participation by  grassroots civic society is also to be promoted. The 
performance of CMAs would be monitored in the light of this long-term perspective. 
Considerable support by DWAF will be needed to build the capacities of local government, 
other organizations, and (potential) large-scale and small-scale water users to engage effectively 
in local-level needs assessment, plan development and transparent, accountable implementation. 
lnformation provision to local government should be the very first step of  any such strategy- 
including that of  the National  Water Resource Strategy, which defines the national  framework 
within which all lower-level  institutions have to function. Current water resource planning tools 
need to become much more user-friendly, more interactive and cheaper. Ultimately, even illiterate 
small-scale water users would need to see their realities reflected and negotiable in the decision- 
support tools and models. 
If  the National  Water Act  is  interpreted in this  sense. those who were  marginalized  in the 
past will increasingly be empowered by using more water more productively for multiple purposes. 
They will also be able to negotiate a better share in water and water-related benefits in a new 
dialogue with the large-scale users who less than one decade ago held virtually exclusive control 
over water resources in South Africa. Literature Cited 
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